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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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I
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~
'

Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Tony Renzo, appeals from a conriction of the crime of manslaughter in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 ( 1953), on trial by jury
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah , the Honorable Brvant
H. Croft pre.
siding.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,i\TER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
the crime of murder in the first degree. A jury trial
was held on June 12-15, 1967. The jury returned a
verdict on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter
and the Honorable Bryant H. Croft imposed sentence
on the appellant of confinement in the Utah State Prison
for the indeterminate term as provided by law of not
less than one nor more than ten years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Third District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following evidence of facts as being more in keeping with the
rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a light
most favorable to the verdict below.
In the early morning of February 28, 1965, Salt
Lake City Police officers were called to a local residence
to investigate the death of one Bertha Magera (R. 150).
The residence was strewn with pieces of human flesh
(R.259), human hair was found in several rooms (R.
262) , and there were large areas of dried human blood
in the bedroom where the deceased was discovered and
in the kitchen (R.171).

2

Evidence was adduced showing that appellant and
deceased had been seeing one another for several months
preYious, and that appellant had a vicious temper and
occasionally resorted to physical punishment of the deceased ( R.470) .
On the evening of February 27, 1965, appellant
and one Clarence 'iVilliams entered the deceased's home
and remained there for some three to four hours ( R.
334). All three were drinking when appellant began
to attack Mr. Williams, hitting him in the face and
kicking him while Williams lay on the kitchen fbor
close to unconsciousness ( R.337).
\Vhile on the floor Williams heard an argument
between deceased and appellant, then felt Bertha's body
striking his and appellant saying "If you want her
you can have her." (R.338). When Williams regained
consciousness, both appellant and deceased had left the
kitchen area but could be heard arguing in another
portion of the residence ( R.339).
Appellant then returned to the kitchen area and
began mopping up the blood which had spilled on the
floor ( R.339) .
Appellant and 'iVilliams then left the residence
with appellant returning early the next morning (R.
363). Two women friends of appellant entered the
residence at that time and discovered the nude body
of the deceased on a bed in the bedroom. Appellant was
recp1ested to remain, but refused to do so and struck
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one of the women as she attempted to restrain him
(R.367).
Police officers took appellant into custody and
found his clothing and shoes coYered with reddish brow 11
stains which appeared to be blood (R397).

An autopsy was performed on the deceased which

revealed multiple bruises covering the face, arms,
trunk, buttocks, and legs; several tears in the wall of
the vagina, and multiple fracturing of the ribs with
one of the fractured ribs puncturing the right lung
(T.221-227). The vaginal tearing could have been
caused by a bamboo stick, (state's exhibit No. 38),
found in the deceased's home with what appeared to
blood on it ( T .180, 224) . The primary cause of death
was respiratory failure due to the fracture of the chest
wall and the resultant inability of the chest wall to
move with respiration, together with the collapsed lung
(T.228).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO DENIAL
OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
Appellant would have this court view the time from
the filing of the complaint against him in February.
1965, until his trial in June, 1967, as a legal continuun1
which, providing there was no waiver of speedy trial b)
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appellant, would constitute a twenty-seven month delay
that could raise serious constitutional questions of speedy
trial.
Hespondent submits, however, that this is not a
proper view of the circumstances presented by appellant's case. Insofar as the events of 1965 are concerned
'
as those proceedings stood at dismissal, the threshold
of the constitutional speedy trial guarantee had not
yet been reached. The dismissal, coming at the end of
preliminary hearing, stopped the process short of binding appellant over for trial.
The rule is firmly established that the protection
of speedy trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment has
no application until after a prosecution is instituted.
Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 888, 82 Sup. Ct. 139, 7 L.Ed.2d
88 ( 1961), also holding that prosecution is not instituted until an indictment is returned or an information
is filed.
The guarantee of speedy trial does not apply from
the time of arrest to the time defendant is bound over
for trial. State v. Enriquez, 102 Ariz. 4<02, 430 P.2d
~22 (1967).
Guarantee of speedy trial does not apply to preiiminary hearing, but rather, to trial held after in<lictment is returned or information filed, and at which the
issue of guilt or innocence is to be determined. Sta! c
l'. Lee, 197 Kan. 463, 419 P.2d 927 ( 1966).
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 ( 6) ( 1953) , which this
court has held in State v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d ~01,
418 P.2d 134 (1966), to be the statutory implementation of federal and state constitutional guarantees to
speedy trial, speaks only of expediting the proceedings
after arraignment.

1

Respondent submits, therefore, that since the 1965
proceedings were dismissed after preliminary inquiry,
the appellant not being bound over for trial, charged by
information, or arraigned, the constitutional rights to
speedy trial were not applicable at the stage of the proceedings at which dismissal was granted. That right
did not attach until appellant was bound over for trial
and was charged by information in April, 1967, and
thus, it cannot be said he was denied a speedy trial.
If this court determines that the constitutional
speedy trial protections were applicable to the 1965 proceedings, they were satisfied by the dismissal occurring
slightly over a month from the time of arrest and had
no application to appellant from that time until the
subsequent institution of proceedings. The facts pre·
sented demonstrate two distinct legal proceedings.

Respondent submits that the proper scope of appli·
cability of the constitutional speedy trial protections,
and its out~r limits in such cases, is illustrated by the
recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), which
is clearly distinguishable from the case on appeal. There,
the Court was faced with a peculiar procedural device
6

1

allowing the prosecution to enter a "nolle prosequi wid1
leave" which permitted the solicitor to reinstate the case
at any time without further court order. Its entry tolled
the statute of limitations as well, and thus subjected
a defendant to an unlimited pendency in which the state
could proceed at will without the necessity of a further
showing of probable cause. In holding this to be violative of the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to speedy
trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court concluded that such indefinite pendency might
subject the petitioner to public scorn, loss of employment, and indefinitely continue the anxiety accompanying public accusation.
Appellant, on the other hand, after a complete
dismissal, !'toad in society as completely absolved; one
against whom not even probable cause had been found.
The statute of limitations was not tolled. A showing
of probable cause still had to be made to bring him
within the judicial process. He had, in fact, not been
prejudiced.
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of United
States v. Young, 237 A.2d 542 ( 1968), on which appellant relies, wrongly equates the situation in that case
(a dismissal and the later institution of like proceedings) with the practice condemned in Klopfer v. North
Carolina, supra. The decision reached in State v. Ackerman, 27 Conn. Supp. 209, 234 A.2d 120 (1967), is
more nearly within the rationale of the Klopfer case.
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There it was held that a nolle prosequi, when unconditionally entered, was a dismissal; and as no conviction
could be had except by beginning a new case agai11st
defendant. There was no case pending against him,
and the right to speedy trial was not denied def endaut
when a new complaint was filed fifteen months later
under either the Sixth Amendment or the state constitutional guarantee.
Assuming the extension of the Klopfer case in
United States v. Young, supra, to be viable, this case
is clearly distinguishable. First the defendant was
charged by information prior to the dismissal of the
first proceeding while appellant was not; and thus,
as has been previously demonstrated, the threshold of
the speedy trial guarantee was reached in that case, but
was not reached in the instant case. Second, the court
there found prosecution had been deliberately delayed,
which from the record, cannot be said of the present case.
As for the claimed prejudice resulting to defendant,
the state cannot be charged with it under these circumstances, just as it cannot be charged with any prejudice
that may result prior to the institution of proceedings,
absent a showing of deliberate delay to gain prosecu·
torial advantage. United States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d
78 (9th Cir. 1967).
The record here does not show such deliberate
delay, and such showing cannot be made by unsuprorte<l
allegations of appellant. As the speedy trial guarantee
was not applicable to appellant in the 1965 proceedingi,
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it was not applicable to him in the intervening time
until institution of proceedings some months later. If
it were applicable to him in 1965, it was satisfied by the
dismissal; thus, again, was not applicable to him in the
intervening time.
While defendants have a constitutional right to
speedy trial, they have no right to a prosecution speedier
than that laid down by the statute of limitations. People
v. Douglas, 54 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1967), citing People v.
Jordan, 45 Cal.2d 697, 290 P.2d 484 (1955); People
v. Ciavarella, 44 Misc.2d 792, 255 N.Y.S.2d 108 ( 1964).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 29
AND 34 AS THEY WENT TO PROVING THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, WERE RELEVANT, PROBATIVE, AND WERE NOT INTRODUCED TO
INFLAME THE JURY.
1

Appellant contends that the admission into evidence
of state's exhibit Nos. 29 and 34 was error. The exhibits
consisted of two colored slides, both of the body of the
decedent in the position and condition it was found
at the scene of the crime. Exhibit 29, a photo taken
from the foot of the bed on which the body was discoyered, demonstrated the bruises on the legs and damage to the vaginal area. Exhibit 34 was a photo dem-
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onstrating the damage to the vagina, with that organ
distended by the examining physician's fingers.

1

The admissibility of photographs is a matter uf
judicial discretion and will not be disturbed unless it
amounts to an abuse of discretion. State v. .J enscn
'
209 Ore. 239, 296 P.2d 618 (1956), People v. Schicrs,
160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 ( 1968), 1llarti11c.:;
v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
On the subject of admission of such evidence, the
Oregon State Supreme Court has stated in State v.
Jensen, supra, at 296 P.2d 634-35:
These lalleged errors] relate to the admission
in evidence of so-called 'gruesome' exhibits over
defendant's objections. They consist of photo·
graphs of the body of the victim of the homicide
... It is too late today to contend that in a capital
case evidence which might shock the sensibilities
of jurors is for that reason inadmissible ....
Counsel for defendant does not so contend, but
argues that the exhibits were irrelevant. Of
course, to bring into the case wholly irrelevant
evidence of a gruesome character merely for the
purpose of exciting feelings of hate on the part
of the jury against the defendant would be indefensible and intolerable. On the other hand,
the prosecution, with its burden of establishing
guilt -beyond a reasonable doubt, is not to be
denied the right to prove eYer>' essential element
of the crime by the most conyincing evidence it
is able to produce. No one would be heard to
object to testimony which does no more th.an
faithfully describe the wounds which were niflicted upon the Yictim of a homicide, no matter
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how horrifying the narration might be. But a
photograph of the corpse may fortify the oral
testimony. Should it be excluded because it is,
perhaps, even more revolting? ':Ve think not,
as long as the defendant stands upon his plea
of not guilty and the burden remains with the
state of proving that the victim met death by the
criminal agency alleged in the indictment.
In these matters much is to be left to the discretion of the trial judge. The test is not whether
the case might have been fully proved. without
the evidence objected to, but whether such eYidence tends to establish the truth of the charge.
The state here had the burden of proving appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
that of first degree murder. To do so, it necessarily had
to prove the elements of that crime; enumerated in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-3 ( 1953), which in part provides:
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing; or committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than the one who is killed; or perpetrated
by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others
and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life ;-is murder in the first degree. . . .
Further, the entire entry of a plea of not guiltr
puts in issue every material allegation of the information. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-4 ( 1953).
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Colored slides of the deceased were held properly
admitted for their probative value in demonstratiu~
malice aforethought, and whether defendant had an
abandoned and malignant heart at the time of the kill.
ing and there admissibility, was not an abuse of discretion even though they were gruesome. People r.
Taylor, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961).

I

j

1

In answer to a defendant's contention that photos
of the body of deceased on the bed where she was found,
and autopsy pictures taken later should have been excluded, the court in People v. 1'oth, 6 Cal. Rptr. 372
( 1960) , replied:
In the trial of a charge of murder in the second
degree it is essential for the People to establish
malice aforethought. Such malice may be shown
by the extent and severity of the injuries inflicted
upon the victim and by the condition in which
the victim was left by her attacker.

Such photos have also been held admissible: To
show the condition of the body, or to indicate the nature I
or extent of wounds or injuries thereon, Reizenstien
v. State, 165 Neb. 865, 87 N.,¥.2d 560 (1958), manner !
of death, location, severity, and number of wounds, I
I
State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543 (1966), I
amount of force used, People v. Kolep, 29 Ill.2d 1160, I
193 N.E. 2d 753 (1963), and the severity and violence
of the assault on the deceased, Commonwealth v. Ray·
mond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 ( 1963) ; the fact that
such photos may be gruesome notwithstanding.

1

1
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In a very recent Idaho murder case, the defendant

was charged with murdering a three year old child by

kicking it to death. The court there held that the charge
involved the element of malice with which the crime
was committed and photographs showing the battered
nude body of the deceased helped to establish the malice.
State v. Martinez, .... Idaho .... , 439 P.2d .... (April 15,
1968).
The court, in rejecting defendant's claim that these
photographs had no probative value and served only
to arouse the passions of the jury, stated at 439 P.2d ·---:
The general rule is that photographs of the
victim in a prosecution for homicide, duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the victim at the time in question are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as an aid to the jury in
arriving at a fair understanding of the evidence,
proof of the corpus delicti, extent of injury, condition and identification of the body, or for their
bearing on the question of the degree or atrociousness of the crime, even though such photographs may have the additional effect of tending
to excite the emotions of the jury. (See generally
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 852[1] [1961];
29 Am. J ur.2d Evidence Secs. 785-788 and 798
[1967]; 159 A.L.R 1413 [1945}. 73 A.L.R.2d
769 [1960l. See also State v. Kleier, 69 Idaho
Idaho 278, 206 P.2d 513 [1949}.)
The generalizations above referred to have
been specifically applied with respect to homicide
cases involving the admissibility into evidence
of photographs for the designated purpose of
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determining the atrociousness or malice with
which the crime was committed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant was not denied
the right to speedy trial and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits complained of. The court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
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